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Abstract 
 
The way that many systems are utilised can be expressed in terms of missions which 
are split into a sequence of contiguous phases.  Mission success is only achieved if 
each of the phases is successful and each phase is required to achieve a different 
objective and use different elements of the system.   
 
The reliability analysis of a phased mission system will produce the probability of 
failure during each of the phases together with the overall mission failure likelihood.  
In the event that the system performance does not meet with the acceptance 
requirement, weaknesses in the design are identified and improvements made to 
rectify the deficiencies.  In conventional system assessments, importance measures 
can be predicted which provide a numerical indicator of the significance that each 
component plays in the system failure.  Through the development of appropriate 
importance measures this paper provides ways of identifying the contribution made 
by each component failure to each phase failure and the overall mission failure.  In 
addition a means to update the system performance prediction and the importance 
measures as phases of the mission are successfully completed is given. 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
A phased mission is used to describe the situation where the system functional 
requirements change throughout the period of operation.   The periods of operation 
between the transition points, where the system functional requirements change, are 
refereed to as phases.  The mission can then be defined as a sequence of phases all of 
which need to be completed successfully for the mission success.  Many systems can 
be seen to operate in this way, typical examples are aircraft, satellites and spacecraft.   
 
The unreliability assessment of phased mission systems produces the likelihood of 
failure during each of the individual phases and also the overall mission failure 
probability.  For some systems it may be possible for maintenance to be performed 
during the mission to rectify faults which have occurred.  The categorisation of a 
mission to be non-repairable or repairable influences the reliability modelling 
techniques which can be used.  Fault tree approaches are appropriate for non-
repairable phased missions (refs 1-3) and Markov methods when some degree of 
repair is possible (refs 4-6).  This paper focuses on non-repairable missions. 
 
Recent work has extended the basic mission unreliability modelling methods to 
indicate the contribution that individual components can make to the mission failure 
(refs 7,8).  The development of these importance measures has extended the concepts 
of the classical Birnbaum measure of importance and the Criticality measure of 
importance (refs 9,10).  The contributions made to each phase failure are calculated 
accounting for the fact that failure in a phase can only occur providing all previous 
 phases have successfully completed.  The phase failure contributions are then 
combined to give an indication of the contribution that each component failure makes 
when considering the entire mission.   
 
As the mission progresses and each phase is successfully completed the predictions 
for the phase and mission failure probability can be updated.  The method to perform 
the revised predictions is given. 
 
2.  Phased Mission Definition 
 
In the modelling presented in this paper the following assumptions are made for the 
phased mission: 
 •  a mission is defined in terms of phases carried out consecutively. 
 •  each phase accomplishes a specified task.  It has different functional     
                 requirements and therefore the failure criteria are different for each phase. 
 •  for a mission success each phase must be completed successfully. 
 •  the time duration for each phase is known. 
 •  the mission is non-repairable and component failures will exist for the  
                remainder of the mission once they occur. 
 •  all components are in the working state at the start of the mission.  
 
3.  Phased Mission Unreliability Quantification 
 
The phased mission is represented as a series of fault trees, each one expressing the 
conditions which will lead to the failure of a specific phase.  The duration of each 
phase is also provided in terms of the times, following the mission initiation, at which 
each phase is entered.  A method to calculate the failure likelihood of such a phased 
mission, the phased mission unreliability Qsys is presented in reference 3.   It provides 
both qualitative and quantitative information regarding phase and mission failure.  
The method presented in this paper breaks down the phase failure modes to identify 
where the significant contributions occur. 
 
Component failures are considered as separate, dependent, events in each phase. The 
notation used is: Ai represents the failure of component A during phase i and Ai,j 
represents the component failing at some point between the start of phase i and the 
end of phase j.  Therefore the event that the component exists in the failed state at the 
end of phase i is: 
i21i,1 A........AAA +++=                                                                (1) 
 
In all logic equations ‘+’ is used to represent OR and ‘.’ is used to represent AND. 
 
The first stage of the method is to establish the phase failure modes.  These are the 
prime implicants (minimal combinations of the component states, working or failed) 
which will result in a particular phase failure and accounts for the successful 
completion of all previous phases.  Considering each phase in turn, the method 
constructs the phase failure fault tree as shown in figure 1.  Boolean reduction of the 
fault trees constructed in this way determines the phase failure modes.  In performing 
the reduction for a phased mission fault tree it is possible to take advantage of the 
non-repairable nature of the component failures.  A special phase algebra has been 
 developed which uses the fact that once failed a component remains that way for the 
rest of the mission.  The algebra uses the following rules: 
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In a phased mission there are two ways that a phase can experience a failure: 
      •  The failure can occur during the phase as a result of a component failure which 
occurs during the phase whose occurrence then fulfils the conditions for phase and 
mission failure.   
•  Alternatively the system can be in a state which already satisfies the conditions 
for phase failure before the phase is entered.  Phase failure will then result as soon as 
the transition into the phase takes place.  In this latter case the component failure 
events in the phase failure mode have all occurred in a previous phase but have not 
satisfied a previous phase failure conditions. 
 
The phase failure modes can be split into the causes of these two categories: in-phase 
failure and phase transition failure. 
 
Failure During
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Phases
Failure
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Met During
Phase i
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Failure in
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combination of
component failure in
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Figure 1 Fault tree for mission failure during phase i 
 
The likelihood of the component failure events which appear in the prime implicants 
obtained for each phase fault tree can be determined by integrating their failure time 
density function over the appropriate time period:  
 ∫
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From the component failure probabilities together with the prime implicant sets the 
inclusion –exclusion expansion (equation 4) can be used to determine the phase 
unreliabilities (conditional on all previous phase success), PiQ and TiQ , the in-phase 
and phase transition failure probabilities respectively.  
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where iC is prime implicant i. 
 
The phase unreliability is then obtained from: 
 
P
i
T
ii QQQ +=       (5) 
 
As will be discussed in later sections, to evaluate the component importance 
contributions a particular formulation of equation 4 (refs 11,12) offers some 
advantages.  Whilst the form of the equation is unimportant for phase failure 
likelihood quantification, the form that will be used later in the importance 
calculations will be described and all expressions used in the examples will be formed 
this way.  Prime implicant terms, iC , will be of a form which can contain components 
failing and functioning through particular phases.  This form will also describe the 
combinations of the prime implicants whose likelihood is to be determined in 
equation 4.  The terms of the inclusion-exclusion expansion are formed using two 
independent variables for the likelihood that any component, i,  works (pi) and that it 
fails (qi).  The relationship that pi+qi=1 is not used to express the whole equation in 
terms of either one of these variables.  For example, if it is required to evaluate the 
probability of the combination of component failure events  233 C.B.A  then the form 
for its probability would be: 
233 CBA
qpq .  Clearly the Boolean reduction carried out 
will prevent situations where the same component exists in both its working and 
failed state. 
 
Summing the phase unreliabilities yields the mission unreliability: 
 
∑= iMiss QQ       (6) 
The phase and mission quantification is illustrated using a simple example system 
provided in the next section.  This example will be used throughout the paper to 
demonstrate the computation of the component importance measures developed in the 
later sections.  
 
4.  Example System Analysis 
 
An example four-phased mission system is illustrated in figure 2.  The failure 
conditions for each of the four phases, in terms of the four components A, B, C and D 
 on which this mission depends, are represented by fault trees.  The time durations in 
each phase i are    (ti-1, ti)  
 
 
Figure 2 Example system phased mission fault trees 
 
In system analysis which follows, iA  represents the functioning of component A 
throughout phase i and extending this across several phases j,iA  represents the 
functioning of component A throughout phases i to j inclusive. 
 
Prior to obtaining the phase failure probabilities, Qi, the in-phase failure probability 
P
iQ , and the phase transition failure probability TiQ  must be quantified.  This requires 
the phase failure modes for each of these events. 
 
Reduction of the fault tree shown in figure 1will yield all causes of phase failure, this 
will include both in-phase and phase transition causes combined in the phase failure 
modes.  The approach taken in this paper determines the in-phase and phase transition 
failure modes separately.  First the combined failure modes are produced by applying 
Boolean reduction to the fault tree of the form shown in figure 1.  Then the phase 
transition failure modes are developed.  By removing the phase transition causes from 
the combined phase causes will provide the in-phase failure modes. 
 
Combined failure modes 
 
Phase 1 
There are no previous phases and so this phase can be treated as a normal non-phased 
mission system.  The logic expression for the causes of failure in phase 1, Ph1 and the 
likelihood of this event, Q1, are given by: 
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In constructing the fault tree for mission failure during phase 2 it will combine the 
causes of success in phase 1 ( 1111 B.ABA =+ ) and the failure conditions for phase 2 
being met in phase 2 ( 2,12,12,1 DB.A + ).  The failure logic expression and failure 
likelihood during phase 2 is: 
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Phase 3 
The logic expression for phase 3 is constructed using the causes of successful 
completion of phase 1, successful completion of phase 2 and the failure conditions of 
phase 3 being met in phase 3: 
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Phase 4 
Repeating the procedure for phase 4 gives, for completeness, the results: 
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Phase transition failure modes and probabilities 
 
The phase transition failure modes can be obtained by modifying the top event in the 
fault tree structure shown in figure 1.  Failure on transition to phase i requires success 
in the previous phases (as in the original structure) AND the failure conditions for 
phase i are met prior to phase i.  This latter input branch to the top event fault tree is 
formed in the same way as before except component failures are only expanded up to 
the previous phase ie: 1i21 A....AA −+++ . 
 
The phase transition failure modes, TiPh  and probabilities 
T
iQ  for the simple example 
system shown in figure 2 are: 
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Phase 4 transition failure 
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In-phase failure modes and probabilities 
 
For each phase the in-phase failure modes are obtained by removing the phase 
transition failure modes from the combined failure modes.  These are given, together 
with the associated probabilities, below: 
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In equations 14 and 18 the algebra required for the failure mode subtraction is 
obvious.  In equation 16 the process is not as transparent and each term is first 
expanded to its fundamental failure modes expressed in terms of single phase 
variables prior to performing the subtraction. 
 
5.   Component Importance Measures 
 
The Criticality Measure of importance identifies the contribution that each component 
makes to the system failure.  This concept will be extended to the phased mission 
context to produce the importance measures for components for both phase and 
mission failure.  In order to calculate the criticality measure the likelihood of the 
system being critical for each component needs to calculated (Birbaum’s measure of 
 importance). This needs the concept of a critical system state which for non-phased 
missions is defines as: 
 
A Critical System state for component i is a state of the remaining components in the 
system such that the failure of component i will cause the system to make a transition 
from the working state to the failed state. 
 
The probability that the system is in a critical system state for any component is 
Birnbaum’s measure of importance, Gi and can be calculated from: 
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From this the criticality measure of importance can be determined.  It is the 
probability that the system is in a critical state for component i and that component i 
has failed.  This is normalised by dividing by the system failure probability.  This 
calculates the likelihood that component i has caused the system failure.  The 
Criticality measure of importance for component i is given by: 
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6.  Critical Phase States 
 
In-phase failure 
 
For multi-phased missions the possible component states in any phase are dependent 
upon which failures have occurred during all the preceding phases up to and including 
phase j. 
 
A critical phase state for component i in phase j is a state of the remaining 
components through the previous and current phases such that the system is working 
on entry to phase j and failure of component i during phase j will cause the phase  
(and mission) failure. 
 
For this to happen: 
i) all phases up to phase j must have completed successfully,  and 
ii) component i must be in the working state on entry to phase j  
 
As an example consider the critical phase states for component A in phase 2 for the 
simple example system shown in figure 2.  In phase 2 the system state is determined 
by the state of components A, B and D.  In evaluating the critical phase states for A 
we need to consider the states of components B and D through phase 2 and the 
preceding phase 1. There are three options for each of the components; they can fail in 
phase 1, fail in phase 2 or work throughout both phases.  For the two components this 
gives 9 states to consider, which are listed in the first column of table 1.  Any 
combination of states which includes B failed in phase one will result in phase 1 
failure and do not need to be considered in phase 2.  In phase 2 if D has failed then the 
phase 2 fails regardless of the state of component A and so these combinations are not 
 critical for A.  It is only when D is working and B has already failed that it is critical 
for A which is just the one combination in row 9.  The probability of this combination 
is the criticality for component A in phase 2 ie: 
 
2,12 DB2,A
pqG =      (22) 
Where Gi,j denotes the criticality function of component i in phase j.   
 
As the number of components and the number of phases increases this tabular 
approach soon becomes impractical and another derivation of the criticality function 
is required. 
 
OTHER 
COMPONENT 
STATES 
FAILS IN 
PHASE 1? 
CRITICAL FOR 
COMPONENT A IN 
PHASE 2? 
PROBABILITY 
12,1 D.B  No No - 
22,1 D.B  No No - 
2,12,1 D.B  No No - 
11 D.B  Yes - - 
21 D.B  Yes - - 
2,11 D.B  Yes - - 
12 D.B  No No - 
22 D.B  No No - 
2,12 D.B  No Yes 2,12 DB pq  
 
Table 1 Criticality of component A in phase 2. 
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The last step above being true as Qj is a linear function of jiq .   Note the expression 
for Qj derived from the combined phase failure modes is used.   For example: 
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 This agrees with the expression derived from table 1.   
 
All derivatives which give the criticality for each component i in each phase j are 
given in table 2. 
 A B C D 
Phase 1 
1B
p  
1A
p  0 0 
Phase 2 
2,12 DB
pq  
2,12 DA
pq  0 
2211 BABA
qqpp −  
Phase 3 0 
2,13,11 DCA
pqp  
2,131
2,122,1
DBA
DBA
pqp
pqp +
 
0 
Phase 4 0 0 0 
3,13,11
3,12,12,13,12,11
3,113,112,1
CBA
CBACBA
BACBA
ppp
pppppp
ppppp
−
−+
+
 
  
Table 2 Birnbaums measure of importance for each component in each phase 
 
Phase transition failure 
 
The phase transition function is likelihood of failure on transition to each phase, TjQ .  
For each component i that contributes to this phase transition failure there will a 
criticality function, T kjiG ,,  expressing the probability that the system is in a critical 
condition such that the failure of the component i in a phase k prior to phase j will 
cause the phase transition failure.  This is given by: 
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The transition criticality function (equation 25) for each component in the simple 
phased mission example presented in figure 2 for each of the 4 phases is given in table 
3. 
i j Phase of 
component 
failure  k A B C D 
Phase 
2 
1 0 0 0 
11 BA
pp  
Phase 
3 
1 0 0 
2,122,1 DBA
qqp  0 
 
2 0 
2,12,12,1 DCA
pqp  
2,122,1 DBA
pqp  0 
Phase 
4 
1 0 0 0 0 
 
2 0 0 0 0 
 3 0 0 0 
3,13,11
3,12,12,13,12,11
3,113,112,1
CBA
CBACBA
BACBA
ppp
pppppp
ppppp
−
−+
+
 
  
Table 3 Transition criticality function for the phase j failure for component i in phase 
k 
 
7.   Phase Importance Measures 
 
In-phase importance 
 
Equation 20 gives the criticality measure of importance for component i in a non-
phase mission.  Extending this to give the importance contribution to the failure of 
component i in phase j is: 
 
j
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This in-phase importance measure provides the contribution that the failure of 
component i has in causing a failure of the mission during phase j.  The phase failure 
can also occur due to a failure on transition to the phase. Both in-phase and transition 
failures will contribute to Qj.  The two importance contributions can however be 
considered individually. 
 
Phase transition failure 
 
Phase transition failure requires that the failure conditions for phase j have occurred in 
some phase k prior to phase j and that these conditions do not result in any previous 
phase failure.  The transition importance measure, T jiI ,   , is the failure contribution that 
component i makes to the transition failure in phase j as a proportion of the total phase 
failure.  The contribution of the component i is summed over all the preceding phases 
to phase j ie: 
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The total importance contribution of component i to the phase j failure is: 
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8.  Mission Importance Measures 
 
When a system does not reach the required level of performance over a mission 
decisions need to be made as to how the system can be improved in order to achieve a 
better performance.  Weak aspects of the system design need to be identified and 
rectified.  Importance measure can aid in the process of identifying the most 
significant contributions to the system failure.  For a phased mission system it is 
necessary to identify the contribution to failure made by the components with regard 
to the entire mission, not just any signal phase.  The criticality measure over the 
mission for each component i is given by the proportion of mission failures to which 
component i contributes: 
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9.  Mission Progression 
 
Depending of the mission duration, for some systems it is possible to track the 
progress of the mission, for example a satellite mission.  As the mission successfully 
completes its sequence of phases the mission or phase failure likelihoods can be 
updated conditional on the successful completion of each phase.  
 
If the mission has progressed successfully to the end of phase k then the probability of 
failure, Qj during phases kj ≤≤1 is known to be zero.  For predictions on the phase j 
failure probability conditional on having successfully completed phases 1…k,  
kjQ  
we have: 
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In the same way the probability of failure on transition to phase j and the probability 
of in-phase failure in phase j conditional on the successful completion of the first k 
phases are: 
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The updated mission failure probability is then: 
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10. System Example 
 
Considering the example phased mission system illustrated in figure 2 and the 
component phase failure probabilities given in table 4, the phase failure probabilities 
 are:  1Q =0.28,  2Q =0.11275,  3Q =0.01105 and 4Q =0.2106.  These are made up of in-
phase and phase transition contributions:  PQ1 =0.28,  PQ2 =0.04075,  TQ2 =0.072,  
PQ3 =5.631 x 10-3,   TQ3 =5.419 x 10-3 ,  PQ4 =0.1404 and TQ4 =0.0702.  This gives an 
overall mission failure probability of MissQ =0.6144 
 
 A B C D 
Phase 1 0.1 0.2 0.025 0.1 
Phase 2 0.05 0.1 0.05 0.05 
Phase 3 0.2 0.05 0.025 0.1 
Phase 4 0.025 0.1 0.05 0.2 
 
Table 4 Component phase failure probabilities 
 
Using equations (26), (27), and (29) the component importance measures throughout 
the phased mission are given in table 5. 
 
Component In- 
Phase 
1 
import 
Trans 
to 
Phase 
2 
import 
In- 
Phase 
2 
import 
Trans 
to 
Phase 3 
import 
In- 
Phase 
3 
import 
Trans 
to 
Phase 
4 
import 
In- 
Phase 
4 
import 
Total 
Mission 
import 
A 0.2857 0 0.0377 0 0 0 0 0.1371 
B 0.6429 0 0.0377 0.4904 0.3462 0 0 0.3149 
C 0 0 0 0.04904 0.25 0 0 0.1799 
D 0 0.6386 0.3171 0 0 0.3333 0.6667 0.5181 
 
Table 5 Importance Contributions 
 
As the mission successfully completes phases equations (30) and (32) proivde the 
phase and overall mission failure probabilities which are given in table 6. 
 
 
 1Q  2Q  3Q  4Q  MissQ  
0 0.28 0.11275 0.01105 0.2106 0.6144 
1 - 0.1566 0.01535 0.2925 0.4645 
2 - - 0.01820 0.3468 0.3650 
3 - - - 0.3532 0.3532 
 
Table 6 Phase Progression Failure Probabilities 
  
11. Conclusions 
 
A phased mission modelling approach has been presented.  A means to evaluate the 
contribution made by each component to phase and mission failure has been 
developed.  The method enables the phase and mission failure likelihood predictions 
to be updated as phases of the mission are successfully completed. 
 
 The work will be developed to enable importance measures to be updated as phases 
are completed successfully. A Binary Decision Diagram implementation is also 
expected to increase the efficiency of the quantification process for the updated 
mission unreliability and importance measure predictions so that thee can be 
accomplished in real time and open up the application of this sort of work to the 
development of decision making approaches for  autonomous systems. 
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